February 19, 2009--Behavioral Diplomacy

Like the new fields of Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Finance, I have been thinking about a new diplomatic field, one I here tentatively name Behavioral Diplomacy. A new approach that I am sensing the Obama administration is rolling out.

Like its economic brethren, Behavioral Diplomacy owes much to the field of psychology. Thus, rather than just focusing on traditional aspects of diplomacy—the step-by-step building of political, economic, military, and cultural relationships—it seeks to engage other countries, especially those that have traditionally defined as our enemies, psychologically. It recognizes that the leaders of countries, like all individuals, do not always behave rationally—according to what would appear to be their best self-interest.

Why, for example, would Iran and North Korea, both with deeply troubled economies (in North Korea’s case many people live on the brink of starvation), why would they invest so much in ambitious nuclear programs? On the surface, it “makes no sense.” But in Behavioral Diplomatic terms they are both being guided by a national emotional logic that actually makes perfect sense.

They both feel respect-poor and thus seek to expand their military power, at least the threat of it, to gain the attention and regard of other countries in their region, but especially the western powers. Read, particularly, the United States.

Behavioral economics and behavioral finance are closely related fields that have evolved to become separate branches of economic and financial analysis where they apply research on human, social, cognitive, and emotional factors to better understand economic decisions by consumers, borrowers, and investors; and how these affect prices and the way consumers and institutions allocate resources.

For example, applying traditional economic theory to the ways in which people make decisions about what house to buy, it is assumed that they think about it rationally—checking comparable prices in the neighborhood, analyzing the performance of local public schools, making a careful assessment of their capacity to get and pay for a mortgage, having an engineer inspect the property to see if there are any structural or mechanical problems--smart things of this kind.

But behavioral economic research suggests that other, less rational factors are at work—real estate agents call it the "Ah-Ha Factor": If clients open the front door and are hit by a wave of feeling that makes them feel that this is the place for us, this feels like home, they are more likely than not to overlook practical issues and make every effort to buy the place.

In diplomacy, if the Obama foreign policy team can successfully appeal to countries sense of national and cultural pride—as Hillary Clinton was attempting to do yesterday in Islamic Indonesia—thus showing them the respect they seek--perhaps they will begin to look at America, begin to reciprocate, by also relating to us in new ways.

A dramatic example of this is the remarkable turn-around in Libya’s behavior. For years Libya, under the dictatorial leadership of Muammar Gaddafi, with a well-developed nuclear weapons program, was a state sponsor of terrorism, which included the attack in 1988 on Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland that murdered nearly 300. Libya began to change its behavior and accept responsibility for the bombing of the Pan Am flight and slowly emerged from international scorn and economic isolation after a controversial 1997 visit by Nelson Mandela in which Mandela literally put his arm around Gaddafi and called him his “African brother.” And in 2003, Libya voluntarily began to dismantle its nuclear weapons program.

The traditional diplomatic weapons of economic sanctions and international isolation certainly brought Libya to the point of openness to Mandela’s form of behavioral diplomacy; but I suspect without the latter it would likely have been decades more before we would have seen any dramatic changes in Libya’s posturing on the world stage.

Gaddafi and Libya have gone so far in their rehabilitation that even the Bush administration used them as an example when urging North Korea to amend its ways, and Gaddafi today is serving as chairman of the 53-nation African Union.

Currently, Richard Holbrooke, newly named to be our representative in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region, has been speaking openly about how Iran can be helpful there to our mutual interests. Ours are obvious; but Iran, which shares to its east a lengthy border with Afghanistan, across which almost all Afghani opium is smuggled, has its own reasons to be concerned about a return to power of the Taliban and a resurgent al Qaeda.

Again, then, there are traditionally-defined national security reasons why Iran might want to be involved in helping in Afghanistan (they actually have been since 2002); but it is unlikely that they will expand that participation until and unless the United States begins to treat them with the respect to which they as a nation feel entitled. When they were Persia they were recognized as one of the great powers of the ancient world and want now to be regarded accordingly. The move toward the development of atomic weapons is perhaps as much to underline that point and, as with Libya, to get world’s attention. In that regard it is certainly working.

Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton have been talking about using all aspects of our power as we attempt to find new ways to navigate our way among nations—not so exclusively deploying military power as in the recent past.

They speak about the power of economic development, the example of our values, and utilizing the tools of diplomacy. They will succeed, and we are already seeing evidence that they understand this, if that diplomacy is nuanced and includes the unique power that can be mobilized only by engaging others in the realm of behavior.