February 5, 2010--While We Were Away

While the voters of Massachusetts were firing a shot across the national political bow, while Barack Obama was meeting and jousting with Republican House members and then Democratic Senators, while he released his red-ink budget for FY 2011 and beyond, while we were beginning a new debate about Don't Ask, Don't Tell, while all this and more was going on and sucking up all the media's oxygen, halfway around the world, Obama's new plans for Afghanistan were taking shape.

Recall, in early December up at West Point, President Obama unveiled a new strategy for Afghanistan. It included sending in a surge of 30,000 troops (he, though, studiously avoided calling it a Bush-like "surge") to deny the Taliban and al Qaeda safe havens along the Afghan-Pakistan border and, most important, to train more Afghani police and expand their national army. The latter goal was essential if we are ever going to be able to extract ourselves and bring our troops home. The future depends upon helping the Afghan people to police and defend themselves.

So, two months into this, how are things going?

Not very well, according to a recent report in the New York Times. (Linked below.)

In a slightly overstated summary of the state of affairs there, the general charged with building an effective Afghan police force is quoted as saying, "It's better [for police recruits] to join the Taliban; they pay more money."

This is no longer literally true since the Afghan government recently upped police wages to between $165 and $240 a month while the Taliban pay just $200 a month. But even with the new pay levels (with the higher amount reserved for police officers assigned to "hostile areas") a report from the U.S and NATO commanders reveals that one in five recruits have tested positive for drugs (Afghanistan is the world's leading producer of opium poppies); fewer than one in ten is capable of reading (including license plates); after training only a percentage of recruits can pass a firearms test but nonetheless are sent out into the field. As a result, these policemen suffer much higher casualties than the security forces fighting the Taliban.

And so it is no wonder that poor pay and these high casualty rates each year lead about 25 percent to quit the national police force.

The report also reveals that police are sent out into hostile territory without either the proper weapons or appropriately armored vehicles. Most of the deaths are the result of ambushes where having the proper equipment is essentil to survival. But without it who can blame so many from walking away. Quite a few who do in turn join the Taliban and then attempt to blow up their own former comrades.

Quel mess.