December 8, 2009--Pashtunistan
The only thing Barack Obama mentioned more frequently than 9/11 in his West Point speech last Tuesday was Pakistan. He alluded to it fully 25 times.
And yet, the speech was mostly about Afghanistan: How we got involved there in the first place (thus the 9/11 references), why we need to expand our efforts there (to stabilize the corrupt Karzai government, to keep the Taliban from retaking control of the country, but primarily to continue to disrupt Al Qaeda and not allow it to have a safe haven again in Afghanistan), and what he plans to have us do (expand our forces there by 30,000 troops and begin to withdraw them in July 2011).
If he wanted to talk about the real threats that we face in that region, his entire speech should have been about the “country” of Pashtunistan. Never heard of Pashtunistan? Neither had I until Sunday when I read about it in the New York Times. (Article linked below.)
You will not be able to find it on the map though it should be a recognized country if geography and, more important history and culture, were used to determine borders.
Afghanistan and Pakistan, very much on the world’s mind, on the other hand, are considered real countries—they have governments, flags, national anthems, and seats at the UN—though they exisit only because former colonial powers such as Great Britain and Russia in the late 19th century created them as they struggled for domination in the region.
But between those two “countries” sits the Pashtun people with their cultural land straddling Pakistan and Afghanistan—the 39 million Pashtuns occupy 1,000 miles of territory on both sides of the1,500 mile Afghan-Pakistan border. 12 million on the Afghan side and 27 million in what we call Pakistan. They have their own language (Pashto), their own ancient moral and legal codes (Pashtunwali), and a centuries-old inclination not to pay much attention to the fictional political national boundaries drawn in the sand and mountains.
And it is in Pashtunistan that Al Qaeda and the Taliban leadership are most at home and welcomed.
Though this is where we are actually intensifying our efforts (we appropriately care much more about Al Qaeda than Karzai and Pashtunistan is where their leaders are, including, remember him, Osama bin Laden), President Obama was obviously reluctant to talk much about war in a third country—Pakistan. With two already underway, you can only imagine what Americans would say if he spoke about needing to start a war in a fourth country—Pashtunistan—even though that’s what we have been doing, waging war there, more intensively since he took office. Mostly with unmanned drones and Special Forces troops than with tanks and Humvees.
The talked-about strategy is the old-hammer-and anvil gambit. In this case America does the hammering and Pakistan is supposed to serve as the anvil. We pound the Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Pashtunistan on the Afghan side while the Pakistani army serves as the anvil on the Pakistan side.
One problem, and a major one it is, has been the reluctance on the part of the Pakistanis to see Al Qaeda and the Taliban as the major threat to their own security—they have most of their troops massed along their border with India, their historic enemy and the other nuclear-armed power in the region. Even with pressure, and threats, and bribes from the U.S. government, Pakistani leaders have been unwilling to rebalance the distribution of their soldiers to a hot war in the west with the Pashtuns from a cold standoff in the east with the Indians.
Thus the hammer-and-anvil, in the minds of some, has been more a hammer-and-pillow.
In the words of an American military officer deeply experienced in combat along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, when Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters retreat across it into what is known as Pakistan they wave their rifles at our troops to taunt them, knowing that “our rules said we couldn’t follow them and we couldn’t shoot at them unless they shot at us. And then when we saw them over the border, we knew we should expect an attack that night.” He added, “The only ones who recognized the border were us with our G.P.S.”
So is it any wonder we haven’t been hearing too much about Pashtunistan? If we want to “win” there, whatever that means, we probably should pay more attention to its existence and what we are actually facing.
And yet, the speech was mostly about Afghanistan: How we got involved there in the first place (thus the 9/11 references), why we need to expand our efforts there (to stabilize the corrupt Karzai government, to keep the Taliban from retaking control of the country, but primarily to continue to disrupt Al Qaeda and not allow it to have a safe haven again in Afghanistan), and what he plans to have us do (expand our forces there by 30,000 troops and begin to withdraw them in July 2011).
If he wanted to talk about the real threats that we face in that region, his entire speech should have been about the “country” of Pashtunistan. Never heard of Pashtunistan? Neither had I until Sunday when I read about it in the New York Times. (Article linked below.)
You will not be able to find it on the map though it should be a recognized country if geography and, more important history and culture, were used to determine borders.
Afghanistan and Pakistan, very much on the world’s mind, on the other hand, are considered real countries—they have governments, flags, national anthems, and seats at the UN—though they exisit only because former colonial powers such as Great Britain and Russia in the late 19th century created them as they struggled for domination in the region.
But between those two “countries” sits the Pashtun people with their cultural land straddling Pakistan and Afghanistan—the 39 million Pashtuns occupy 1,000 miles of territory on both sides of the1,500 mile Afghan-Pakistan border. 12 million on the Afghan side and 27 million in what we call Pakistan. They have their own language (Pashto), their own ancient moral and legal codes (Pashtunwali), and a centuries-old inclination not to pay much attention to the fictional political national boundaries drawn in the sand and mountains.
And it is in Pashtunistan that Al Qaeda and the Taliban leadership are most at home and welcomed.
Though this is where we are actually intensifying our efforts (we appropriately care much more about Al Qaeda than Karzai and Pashtunistan is where their leaders are, including, remember him, Osama bin Laden), President Obama was obviously reluctant to talk much about war in a third country—Pakistan. With two already underway, you can only imagine what Americans would say if he spoke about needing to start a war in a fourth country—Pashtunistan—even though that’s what we have been doing, waging war there, more intensively since he took office. Mostly with unmanned drones and Special Forces troops than with tanks and Humvees.
The talked-about strategy is the old-hammer-and anvil gambit. In this case America does the hammering and Pakistan is supposed to serve as the anvil. We pound the Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Pashtunistan on the Afghan side while the Pakistani army serves as the anvil on the Pakistan side.
One problem, and a major one it is, has been the reluctance on the part of the Pakistanis to see Al Qaeda and the Taliban as the major threat to their own security—they have most of their troops massed along their border with India, their historic enemy and the other nuclear-armed power in the region. Even with pressure, and threats, and bribes from the U.S. government, Pakistani leaders have been unwilling to rebalance the distribution of their soldiers to a hot war in the west with the Pashtuns from a cold standoff in the east with the Indians.
Thus the hammer-and-anvil, in the minds of some, has been more a hammer-and-pillow.
In the words of an American military officer deeply experienced in combat along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, when Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters retreat across it into what is known as Pakistan they wave their rifles at our troops to taunt them, knowing that “our rules said we couldn’t follow them and we couldn’t shoot at them unless they shot at us. And then when we saw them over the border, we knew we should expect an attack that night.” He added, “The only ones who recognized the border were us with our G.P.S.”
So is it any wonder we haven’t been hearing too much about Pashtunistan? If we want to “win” there, whatever that means, we probably should pay more attention to its existence and what we are actually facing.
posted by Steven Zwerling at
1:41 AM
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