December 14, 2006--Doubling Down

Lost in the NY Times’ report about the last stop on President Bush’s fictionally titled “Listening Tour” before he announces his new plans for Iraq, a meeting at the Pentagon with the Joint Chiefs, is the outline of that plan that is beginning to leak out.

The Times article focuses on the political issues—Bush saying that he will not be “rushed” to issue the new strategy, that he will wait until early 2007, presumably hoping by that time that the public, sated on PlayStations and overeating, will have forgotten the Baker-Hamilton Study Group report that sharply criticized current policy, including any effort to continue to fantasize about “victory.” (Article linked below.)

But it’s the emerging military strategy being leaked that is the real story. Thus far not covered by the Times. This strategy could be called Keep-Staying-the-Course or John-McCain’s-(Maybe-Hillary-Clinton’s)-Last-Stand-at-the-Alamo.

It calls for the “insertion” of tens of thousands of additional troops, some of whom will be “imbedded” in Iraqi battalions to serve as trainers while others will be used in combat to help quell the escalating violence.

The Neo-con Weekly Standard, though, has the story and calls it “Doubling Down.” They write:

Don't throw good money after bad. When you're in a hole, stop digging. . . . These are the kinds of things Americans are hearing and saying about the war in Iraq. It's understandable. When you gamble and lose, the natural tendency is to . . . mortgage everything you have to try to retrieve your losses. But as every undergraduate economics student knows, that strategy is a disaster. . . . When an investment isn't working, get out. . . .

All of which seems to apply to Iraq, in spades. A seemingly quick and easy military victory has turned sour. The costs, in blood and treasure, have escalated. Victory looks uncertain and distant. It seems the time has come, if not to cut and run, then surely to cut our losses. . . .

But that instinct is wrong. Warfare is not like investment banking. At precisely the moment an economist might say to stop throwing good money after bad, a wise military strategist might say to double the bet. . . . Why might that be so? For one thing, willingness to raise the stakes often wins the game.

Putting aside for the moment that Iraq is anything but a game, but staying with the doubling-down analogy, how in fact does doubling-down work in the game where it was invented—in Blackjack?

The opportunity to double down occurs only after you have been dealt your first two cards. At that point you can opt to double your bet (if you bet $25, you can increase it to $50), but after doing that you get just one final card. This can be a smart idea if your two cards total 10 or 11 points because there is the likelihood that the last card will be worth 10 points which would give you 21, the best possible hand.

So far so good. But here’s the problem with extrapolating this strategy to Iraq—in Blackjack you should only double down when you are in a favorable situation, one where you can dramatically increase your odds of winning.

The situation in Iraq is anything but favorable.

Maybe then the Blackjack analogy that would be more appropriate would be to think about doubling down there now as a Sucker Bet. For example, as if you doubled when your first two cards added up to 15 points and the third and final card would therefore likely put you over 21. In other words, as they say in the casinos, where you would Go Bust.

But then boys will be boys, and I suspect we’re all again about to be suckers.